Wealth Inequality and Altruistic Bequests
This paper examines the role of bequests and inter vivos gifts in the U.S. economy, considering their importance in determining (i) the economy's aggregate capital stock,
(ii) the distribution of private net worth, and (iii) public policy outcomes and options. It focuses on several recent calibrated simulations.
There is a longstanding debate in the economics literature about the relative importance of life-cycle and bequest-motivated wealth accumulation (e.g., Modigliani [1988] ).
The same issue arises in analysis, for example, of the well-known simulation model of Auerbach and Kotlikoff [1987] : in the ultimate variant of the model (in Ch.11), pure lifecycle incentives do not fully account for the U.S. capital stock. The omission of private intergenerational transfers might explain the shortfall.
There is little disagreement that the U.S. distribution of private net worth is highly concentrated (e.g., Wolff [1996] ). In the 1995 SCF, the top 5 percent of wealth holders account for 56% of private U.S. net worth, the top 1 percent hold 35%, and the Gini coefficient is .79. Even after adjusting for private pensions and consumer durables (see Laitner [2001] ), the shares are 48% and 28%, respectively, and the Gini is .73. Put another way, mean net worth per household (in the original data) is $212,000, but the median is only $57,000. It seems that a complete model of saving might require two types of households: a small group who have enormous net worth, and a large group who have little.
The different policy implications of the life-cycle and the simplest altruistic model are well-known: in a life-cycle model, national debt and unfunded social security crowd out private capital accumulation (e.g., Diamond [1965] ); in a representative-agent incarnation of the altruistic model, debt and social security may well have no effect on capital at all (e.g., Barro [1974] ). In fact, the economy's equilibrium capital intensivity is almost always an issue in the former model; in the latter, it tends to be affected through taxes on estates and the income of capital (e.g., Chamley [1986] , Lucas [1990] ). This paper reviews three models with bequests, considering their merits. Then it describes several recent calibration studies.
Framework
We first present several variants of a very stylized model. It has a closed economy with an aggregate production function. There are no business cycles. We focus on steady-state equilibria. Households are born with differing earning abilities -the distribution of the latter being exogenous and stationary -but they all have the same preference orderings.
We assume that even if parent households care about the utility of their descendants, altruism does not flow the other direction (eg, Laitner [1997] ).
Each household lives at most two periods, supplying 1 unit of labor in the first, and 0 in the second. A household has one adult, and he raises one child. The child leaves home as the parent retires. If a household's consumption is c 1 in youth, the corresponding utility flow is U young (c 1 ); if the household's consumption is c 2 in old age, the utility flow is U old (c 2 ). A household's probability of being alive in old age is q ∈ [0, 1]. Consider a steady state with constant wage w and interest rate r. There is a proportional tax on intergenerational transfers σ, but we omit income taxes.
In a pure life-cycle world with "actuarially fair" annuities, there are no inheritances, inter vivos gifts, or bequests. A household born with earning ability z solves
where s is life-cycle saving. This is our version of, say, the model of Auerbach and Kotlikoff [1987] . There will be a distribution of asset holdings by the elderly, reflecting the distribution of z, and there will be a distribution of earnings among the young. There are a number of ways to incorporate intergenerational transfers. First, suppose annuities markets do not exist. Then a household born with earning ability z and (aftertax)
With no access to annuities, the household's rate of return on life-cycle saving is lower. If the household remains alive in its second period of life, its bequest is 0; if it dies, its heir
Suppose estates pass from parents to their children. Solution of (2) 
Maximization determines the child's inheritance, say, i , as a function of i and z: i = 
where z is the child's ability. Letting the child's inheritance be i , maximization determines A lack of annuity markets is a key assumption of the accidental model. In practice, private pensions often incorporate annuities, but independent annuities are rare. The conventional explanation is that adverse selection makes these securities unattractive. However, the introduction notes that a miniscule group of wealthy households noticeably affect total U.S. net worth. It seems likely that insurers could offer individually-tailored annuities to very wealthy individuals, administering thorough health examinations to circumvent adverse selection. Yet, this virtually never seems to happen in practice.
Existing evidence on the division of estates within families shows a tendancy toward equal shares, regardless of siblings' job market success (eg, Laitner [1997] ). This is contrary to the altruistic model, but not to the other two. For consistency with altruism, one might have to argue that social norms demand equal division of estates.
If government confiscates accidental estates, donors should not care. The latter seems inconsistent with the estate planning which wealthy individuals often undertake. One possible problem is that actual intergenerational transfers presumably follow from a mixture of motives (eg, Nishiyama [2001] ), and statistical specifications should take this into account. Another is that most surveys have a thin sample of rich households -the very group for whom bequest incentives are probably most powerful.
Simulation Models
As noted, recent examples of calibrated simulation models include Altig et al. [2001] with "joy of giving" bequests and Laitner [2001] with "altruistic" bequests. Both calibrate their model to aggregate U.S. net worth. Each has life-cycle and transfer-motivated wealth accumulation, and both provide a breakdown between the two. The fractions due to lifecycle saving alone are, respectively, .70 and .67. In other words, both find life-cycle saving to be the major explanation for U.S. wealth accumulation.
The distribution of private wealth is much more concentrated than the distribution of earnings. Existing work suggests life-cycle saving can explain only a small amount of the difference (eg., Huggett [1996] ). Bequests seem a natural candidate to explain the rest. In the ultimate simulation, ξ = .82 and γ = .70. Thus, parents care almost as much about their grown children as about themselves, and households are surprisingly tolerant of risk.
As in the case of Gokhale et al., the model is able to match the empirical distribution of wealth: simulating over all ages, the shares of the top 5 and 1 percent are, respectively, 43
and 25%, and the Gini coefficient is .75.
Policy Implications
Long-run policy implications tend to depend heavily on the shape of Figure 1 's supply curve. Think about the life-cycle model, with curve ab. Add a perpetual national debt D.
Then we must move to a higher steady-state interest rate, the rate at which household net worth exceeds the business sector's demand for capital exactly by D. In the representative agent dynastic model, with supply cd, the same logic shows no change in the equilibrium interest rate is necessary -a manifestation of Barro's famous "Ricardian equivalence."
One does not expect accidental or joy of giving bequests to affect the shape of supply 
Conclusion
A number of models of bequest behavior seem able to account for aggregate wealth accumulation -though recent studies show life-cycle saving accounting for most of the total. Perhaps more interesting, several models with bequests and a realistic distribution of earning abilities replicate the extreme concentration of the empirical distribution of private wealth. In at least one of these models, private intergenerational transfer behavior is capable of generating dramatic policy implications.
